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Abstract — In this paper, an accurate reconstruction of the 
events preceding the January 13th, 2012 impact of the Costa 
Concordia cruise ship with the rocks of Isola del Giglio is 
presented, along with the emergency countermeasures activated 
by the ship automation system after the impact. The 
reconstruction is entirely based on data recorded by the 
information systems of the ship and demonstrates the importance 
of this kind of data from a scientific and forensics point of view. 
First the authors, three of whom have served as consultants in the 
trial in Grosseto, Italy,  show how information stored in the 
Voyage Data Recorder, the so called “Black Box”, has been used 
to calculate the exact time and coordinates of the impact point. 
An accurate evaluation of these data represents a “conditio sine 
qua non” to ascertain the effects of the helmsman’s error, who 
allegedly misunderstood the Master’s orders just 20 seconds 
before the impact. Then, these effects were studied by means of a 
purposely developed short term manoeuvring simulator, whose 
results are also briefly summarized in the paper. Moreover, 
information stored in the hard disk of the automation system of 
the ship, concerning the activation of emergency source of 
energy, have been examined and some results are briefly 
reported in the paper. The most important data are those 
concerning the watertight doors, the passenger elevators and the 
Emergency Diesel Generator. According to the results of our 
investigations,  i) the helmsman’s error appears to have been 
determinant in the accident; ii) the emergency procedure, which 
started automatically after blackout of the main power source, 
does not appear to have performed correctly. In our opinion, 
both these facts could have influenced the outcome of the last 
phase of the ship evacuation, during which most of the victims 
lost their lives. 
Keywords— Costa Concordia; shipwreck; manoeuvres 
simulator; VDR; black box. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A detailed reconstruction of the events preceding and 
following a great disaster like that of the Costa Concordia 
shipwreck is a very complex task. The accident occurred on 
January 13th, 2012, just in front of the coast of Isola del Giglio 
(Tuscany). Three independent inquiries were conducted, by 
the Italian Coast Guard, by the Italian Justice, and by the IMO 
(International Maritime Organization).  A complete analysis of 
the resulting data is essential not only for forensic purposes, 
but also to ascertain all the causes of the accident and possibly 
also to suggest improvements to emergency equipment and 
procedures. In the days immediately following the shipwreck, 
rather simplistic reconstructions of the event appeared in the 
media, in which the whole responsibility was being attributed 
to the ship’s master, Francesco Schettino. Additional elements 
regarding the behaviour of other crew members and persons 
involved, as well as some apparent malfunctions of the 
emergency systems aboard, were not known or not taken into 
account, thus giving an incomplete picture of the accident. 
During the trial in Grosseto, an extraction of the data stored 
inside the hard disks of the information systems of the ship 
was carried out. The information extracted concerned not only 
the events occurred just before the impact, but also what 
happened up to the abandon of the ship. The results were 
rather surprising and additional facts emerged. For instance, 
from a comparison between the audio files and the 
instantaneous position of the rudders of the ship, both 
recorded in the black box, it was possible to determine that the 
helmsman did not correctly execute the captain’s orders only 
20s before the impact. After this, a specially developed 
manoeuvre simulator stated that this error has had a significant 
effect in the accident. Moreover, data stored in the hard disks 
of the automation system of the ship confirmed that, as 
reported in many testimonies, the emergency generator did not 
operate correctly after the blackout, caused by the flooding of 
the main power sources of the ship. From these data, it was 
also possible to extract useful information about the 
mandatory tests which were periodically performed on this 
equipment. 
The paper illustrates the reconstruction of the events based on 
the data stored in the information systems of the ship. It is 
organized as follows. In Section II, a brief description of the 
two main sources of data used for the aforementioned analysis 
is given. Then, the method with which these data have been 
used for an accurate reconstruction of the impact is described 
in Section III. Section IV contains a brief presentation of the 
short term manoeuvre simulator built during the trial by the 
authors, in order to evaluate the effects of the helmsman’s 
error. Section V presents the reconstruction of some events 
concerning the automatic emergency procedure, namely those 
regarding the emergency generator; finally some conclusions 
are drawn in Section VI.    
 
II. VOYAGE DATA RECORDER AND  AUTOMATION SYSTEM 
 
International regulations about the safety of ships at sea 
require every modern ship to be equipped with a Voyage Data 
Recorder (VDR) to assist investigations in the event of an 
accident. Voyage Data Recorders are systems installed on 
modern vessels to record data related to the ship’s status and 
thus provide data to investigators in the case of an accident. 
While the data collection is performed by different devices, 
such as analog and digital sensors or dedicated computer 
systems, the data recording is usually performed by an 
industrial grade computer. 
According to the regulations, a standard VDR should store at 
least the following data items: date and time (referenced to 
Coordinated Universal Time UTC), position (latitude, 
longitude, coordinate reference), speed, heading, bridge audio 
(through one or more microphones that record conversations 
and audible alarms), VHF (Very High Frequency band) radio 
communications, the preferred way for maritime 
communications, radar data (faithful replicas of radar display 
at the time of recording), depth under keel, main alarms, 
rudder orders and responses, engine orders and responses, hull 
openings status, watertight and fire door status and, where 





Fig. 1 Example of an Integrated Navigation system similar to 
the one installed on the Costa Concordia bridge 
 
 
Fig. 2 Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) system architecture 
 
The VDR is the complete system for processing, encoding and 
recording the data required by the IMO (International 
Maritime Organization) regulations. On modern ships, the 
VDR is integrated into a complete integrated navigation 
system, as shown in Figure 1. The elements of a VDR, as seen 
in Figure 2, are: 
• Concentrator: usually an industrial grade computer 
which acquires data from sensors, processes and encodes them 
and records the stream to the final recording medium. 
• Sensors: external devices from which the VDR 
acquires data. 
• Sensor interface unit: optional device providing 
additional input lines to the concentrator. 
• Final recording medium (FRM): the capsule used to 
store the data, designed to survive an accident and thus enable 
the recovery of the voyage data even in the event of a 
catastrophic loss of the ship. This is the part which is often 
referred to as the “Black Box”. 
• Dedicated power source: an external battery 
exclusively used to power the VDR for at least 2 hours in case 
the ship loses both main and backup power. 
• Bridge alarm unit: a remote interface to manage the 
VDR and acknowledge system alarms and warnings. 
• Replay stations: one or more optional personal 
computers used to download and review voyage data from the 
concentrator. 
In the case of an accident and subsequent investigation, both 
the final recording medium and, if they survived, the 
concentrator and the replay stations can serve as sources of 
data. The final recording medium must store at least the last 
12 hours of data. Recording must continue until 2 hours after 
the loss of ship power. 
The VDR main unit is wired to all the devices which provide 
data. Data sources can be split into categories, depending on 
the interface: 
• Microphones: analog signals from bridge 
microphones, bridge telephones and VHFs: usually sampled 
by the concentrator. 
• Digital signals: state signals carrying information 
about the ship’s alarms and warnings. 
• Analog signals: signals acquired from analog 
transducers: for example, information about position of the 
rudders. 
• Video signals: signals from analog video cameras, 
usually to record the radar display for ships equipped with 
older analog radar devices. 
• Serial data: data generated by smart devices such as 
the weather station, digital radar, AIS () etc. Communication 
usually consists of NMEA strings (discussed shortly). Sensor 
interface units usually convert their analog/digital/serial input 
data into NMEA strings, which are then fed to the main unit.  
• Complex data: bidirectional data connections (usually 
Ethernet) to autonomous devices providing complex data for 
the VDR to store. As an example, modern ships feature radar 
stations which are themselves industrial computers and 
concentrate all the information available on the bridge; these 
stations are able to provide the VDR with, for example, digital 
screenshots of radar displays. 
On modern ships all of these feeds are stored in three formats: 
images (screenshots from the radar display(s), audio files 
(from microphone inputs) and text (NMEA strings 
representing serial, analog and digital inputs). 
The preferred way to store voyage data into the VDR is via 
NMEA strings. NMEA 0183 [1] is a combined electrical and 
data specification for communication among marine electronic 
devices such as echo sounder, sonar, anemometer, 
gyrocompass, autopilot, GPS receivers and many others. It has 
been defined by, and is controlled by, the U.S.-based National 
Marine Electronics Association. 
An example of an NMEA string carrying information about 
the location of a generic GPS receiver is: 
$GPGGA,123519,4807.038,N,01131.000,E,1,08,0.9,545.4,M,
46.9,M,,*47 
The elements composing the string are the following: 
• $: start symbol. 
• GP: first two characters of preamble identify the data 
source (GP for GPS receiver). 
• GGA: last three characters of the preamble give a 
standard description of the following data (GGA for global 
positioning fix data). 
• 123519: time when the fix was taken (12:35:19 
UTC). 
• 4807.038,N: latitude (48 deg. 07.038’ North). 
• 01131.000,E: longitude (11 deg. 31.00’ East). 
• 1: fix quality (1 for GPS fix). 
• 08: number of satellites being tracked. 
• 0.9: horizontal dilution of precision (index of the 
precision of the satellite positioning) 
• 545.4,M: height above mean sea level (545.4 meters). 
• 46.9,M: height of mean sea level above WGS84 
ellipsoid. 
• Empty field: time in seconds since last update. 
• Empty field: DGPS station ID number. 
• *47: checksum data (always begins with *). 
One of the biggest problems in VDR forensics is trying to find 
the meaning of the data contained in non-standard NMEA 
sequences, which the standard allows equipment 
manufacturers to define. This goal can be accomplished either 
with the help of the manufacturer, or if this is not available for 
any reason, by deduction and by combining data from other 
similar sources. 
Investigation of the accident focused mainly on evidence 
extracted from the Voyage Data Recorder. While the FRM 
unit was found to be not working, luckily the concentrator 
survived the accident and enabled investigators to retrieve all 
the required data. 
The disk inside the concentrator was recovered and acquired 
by Italian police and the disk image was made available to all 
the involved parties. The disk content was not immediately 
useful as it was structured in a way not easy to be read without 
a proprietary software. The first step in the investigation was 
then to discover the format of the stored elements and then to 
build an ad-hoc suite of software tools to automate the 
recovery process. 
The disk is an 80 GB device with a single non-bootable 
partition formatted in the QNX 4.0 file system. 
Our analysis began from the “frame” and “NMEA” 
directories, which as we presumed, and later confirmed, 
contained the files related to the radar screenshots and to the 
NMEA sequences archive. 
In these directories we found a large number of files, each one 
without extension and named in numerical order (0000001, 
0000002, etc.), which did not bear any recognizable header. 
Further analysis with an hex editor revealed that the files were 
in fact GZip compressed files preceded by a nonstandard 
header containing what was supposed to be the real name of 
the file, with extension .BMP.GZ for radar frames and 
.LOG.GZ for NMEA files. 
Starting from this knowledge we wrote Bourne Shell and 
Python scripts to extract and decompress the embedded files 
and rename them with their real name. At the end of the 
recovery we were able to obtain: 
• Radar screenshots, stored as bitmap images. These 
had been collected from the two main radar displays of the 
bridge, alternating in intervals of about seven seconds. The 
real names of the files contained an indication to which radar 
display the image was taken from. In total, the folder 
contained 11,759 images spanning for about 24 hours 
preceding the VDR shutdown, hence from January 12th at 
23:06 to January 13th at 23:36 (local time, UTC+1). 
• NMEA strings, stored as ASCII text files. Each text 
file contains a number of long rows. Each row consists of a 
timestamp, in UNIX epoch format (number of seconds since 
midnight, January 1st, 1970) in hexadecimal format, followed 
by some NMEA strings which had supposedly been collected 
at that time. Each file holds strings related to a 5 minutes time 
span, ranging for about a week preceding the VDR shutdown, 
hence from January 6th at 22:50 to January 13th at 23:35 (in 
local time, UTC+1). As in the case of radar images, the file 
namespace is used as a circular buffer [2]. 
After retrieving the data in a useful format, the subsequent 
steps were directed towards finding ways to concentrate these 
data to show specific aspects of the accident, deemed useful 
for the investigation. These aspects, which will be presented in 
the following sections, are the rudder status, in the minutes 
before and after the impact, the status of watertight doors 
during navigation and a check of the route that had been set on 
the autopilot upon departure. 
 
The Martec Security Management System (SMS) is the safety 
supervisor, which collects and manages the safety information 
coming from all the onboard safety systems: fire detection 
system, emergency shutdown system, watertight door system 
and hi-fog system. The SMS forwards a subset of the safety 
information it manages to the VDR, in order to have it 
recorded. The information is sent using the NMEA-0183 
protocol (equivalent to IEC 61162-1). Since the NMEA 
standard does not define specific sentences describing safety 
information, Martec SMS defined some proprietary sentences, 
and provided the documentation needed to decode and 
understand the proprietary NMEA sentences stored into the 
VDR. Unfortunately, this information allowed only a partial 
reconstruction of the events. Martec SMS stores the complete 
set of safety information into proprietary log files. These files 
are stored in a hard disk as a set of 21 binary files named 
according to a scheme like YYYYMMDD.SBL, and cover a 
period from 12/25/2011 to 1/14/2012. Access to this 
information required the active collaboration of Martec, which 
used a proprietary software to extract the data from the log 
files. Martec provided only the data from 1/12/2012 to 
1/14/2012, since the other information was deemed out the 
scope of the investigation. But the failure of the Emergency 
Diesel Generator (EDG), documented in the VDR data and in 
testimonies, required a more in-depth investigation of the tests 
which were periodically performed on EDG. If the tests were 
performed correctly, they would appear in the SMS logs. 
Thus, we tried to extract the previous log files ourselves. We 
were able to decode the binary log files by comparison with 
the data extracted by Martec, using a technique similar to what 
is known as a KPA (Known-plaintext Attack) cryptanalysis 
literature [3]. The analysis showed that each log file presented 
a header of 4 bytes followed by a sequence of events. The file 
header is always the same and is equal to 0x0152424C, the 
sequence of bytes identify a SBL file. Each event is formatted 
as follow: 
 
< EH, Sensor ID, 0x00, State, 0x00, Description, 0x00 > 
 
Where EH is the event header which consists of a constant 
sequence of 21 bytes. It keeps the time information of the 
event, encoded as a UNIX timestamp (integer number of 
seconds elapsed since midnight, Jan 1, 1970 UTC). Sensor ID, 
State and Description are respectively the identifier of the 
sensor that triggered the event, the state of the sensor and a 
brief description of the event. Due to dynamic length of these 
fields, a separator byte (0x00) was used to identify when each 
field ends. 
 
The analysis allowed us to retrieve all the information about 
the EDG from the 25/12/2012, specifically: when the test were 
performed, how many minutes they lasted, all the events 
concerning the EDG room, such as ignition and shutoff of the 
fans. 
III. IMPACT RECONSTRUCTION 
  
During the trial in Grosseto, it emerged that the helmsman 
made a significant error some 20s before the impact, 
misunderstanding the order of captain Schettino and putting 
the rudder “hard to starboard” instead of “hard to port”. This 
was demonstrated by comparing the dialogues recorded by the 
microphones located on the bridge to the values of the rudder 
angle entered by the helmsman at each instant. From a 
forensic point of view, the problem was to ascertain whether 
this error has or not been determinant for the impact. Our 
target was then to find out whether it was possible to avoid the 
impact had the captain’s orders been executed correctly. 
For a correct reconstruction of the facts, it was very important 
to evaluate the exact time at which the hull hit the rocks, as 
well as the exact contact point with the shallows, in the 
coordinate system of the ship’s GPS. In fact, an accurate time-
reconstruction is crucial, due to the short time elapsed between 
the error and the impact. The Judge’s consultants had 
previously performed an evaluation of the ship’s position at 
the estimated impact time (21.45’.07’’). This reconstruction, 
in our opinion, was not consistent with cartographic data: at 
21.45’.07’’, the position of the breach on the ship’s bulkhead 
was about 40m behind the shallows. To investigate this point 
in more depth, we performed an accurate analysis of position, 
heading and time data of the ship. From these data, it was 
possible to calculate the instantaneous (linear and angular) 
velocity and acceleration. These quantities are plotted in Figs, 
3, 4, 5 over time (t=0 corresponds to 21.44’.00’’, local time). 
Fig. 3 shows the behavior of linear velocity.  Fig. 4 shows the 
actual rudder angle  (blue line) along with the rudder angle 
ordered by the Master (red line): the discrepancy is evident in 
the interval 52-72s. 
 

















Fig. 3 Linear velocity of the ship. The star at t=53s 






















Fig.4 Actuated rudder angle: actual (blue) and as ordered (red) 
 
From Figures 3 and 4 it is evident that when the rudder is 
away from its equilibrium position (i.e.  = 0), the velocity 
decreases due to the fluid dynamic drag.  
Figure 5 shows a plot of the acceleration: this is the most 
relevant data for the determination of the impact time. The 
figure shows that the impact can be positioned at 21.45’.12’’ 
(about 70 seconds into the plotted sequence), when a negative 
acceleration peak is observed, which lasts about 8s. This 
acceleration peak clearly indicates the time interval of the 
destructive contact with the rocks, in which about 500 MJ of 
kinetic energy of the ship were dissipated, in about 10s.  
It is worth noting that the mean value of the ship velocity 
during the contact was about 6 m/s. At this speed, the ship 
sailed for about 48 m during the 8 s of the negative 
acceleration peak: this accurately corresponds to the length of 
the breach on the bulkhead of the ship. 
 
 















Fig. 5 linear acceleration of the ship. The star indicates the 
impact time. 
 
From this analysis follows that the initial instant of the 
destructive contact has to be put at 21.45’.12’’, i.e. 5 s later 
than the impact time calculated by the Judge’s consultants. 
This means that the ship was about 40 m ahead of the rocks 
when Schettino gave the order “hard to port” to the 
helmsman, who misunderstood it. The Judge’s consultants, 
using qualitative arguments, stated that the helmsman’s error 
had been inconsequential on the impact. This conclusion in 
our opinion should be reexamined using a quantitative 
approach and taking into account the aforementioned facts.  
 
 
IV. EFFECTS OF THE HELMSMAN ERROR 
To investigate the effects of the helmsman’s error on the 
impact with the rocks, a dedicated simulator was developed. 
The choice was for a short-term simulator, since the error 
occurred about 20s before the impact. This allowed to use a 
simplified model with only three degrees of freedom, 
neglecting roll and pitch angles and z  position. The effect of 
wind and current were also found to be negligible for a short-
term simulation. The hypothesis used to build the model and 
its mathematical formulation are described in [4]. The model’s 
dynamic parameters were derived from known navigation data 
recorded during different manoeuvres, by means of a least 
square fit. This “black box” approach allows the model to 
learn the ship’s response to stated inputs (i.e. rudder angle and 
propeller speeds). 
The simulator was validated by comparing simulated 
trajectories with actual ones. To this end the data recorded in 
the VDR of the Costa Concordia during the last week of 
navigation before the accident were used. In the next phase, 
the final ship position and heading, computed by the 
simulator, were compared to data contained in the VDR, 
allowing us to evaluate the final error (the effect of the length 
of the simulated time interval on final accuracy was also 
evaluated). The simulator can also be used as a “maneuver 
predictor”: further details are presented in [4, 5]. 
The model we just presented allowed us to study the 
maneuvers of the ship in proximity of the Giglio rocks. The 
impact time considered is 21.45’.12’’. Several simulations 
were performed, starting 30s ahead of the impact, just before 
the instant in which the captain planned a “Zig-Zag” maneuver 
as an extreme attempt to avoid the impact, ordering to put the 
rudders “hard to port”. Data recorded in the VDR show that 
the helmsman misunderstood the order and instead set the 
rudders “hard to starboard” (Figure 4). To evaluate the effect 
of this error, the simulation was performed again, this time 
imposing the rudder position ordered by the captain, instead of 
the erroneous one. This rudder sequence was reconstructed 
using the recordings of the bridge audio stored in the VDR 
(Figure 4, red line).  
Figure 6 shows the results obtained: the blue line represents 
the actual ship position at impact time (impact occurred) while 
the green line represents the simulated ship position, without 
the helmsman’s error. The black ellipse represents the rock’s 
position. As can be seen, in this case the left bulkhead of the 
ships is about 10m from the rock. One could safely state that, 
according to the simulator, the ship would have passed close 
to the rock without impacting or, considering the worst case 
for the simulation error and model approximations, the  impact 






Fig. 6 Ship position at impact time without helmsman’s error. 
 
Moreover, rotational speed of the ship would have been 
significantly lower (more than 50%), causing a lower energy 
impact and consequently less serious damages to ship’s hull. 
In the worst case, at least one engine room (and maybe both) 
would sustain no damage in the accident, allowing the ship to 
stay afloat and responsive to later commands. In this case, the 
final consequences would possibly have been different, 
especially in terms of lives lost. 
 
V. AUTOMATIC EMERGENCY PROCEDURE MALFUNCTIONINGS 
 
Another field of investigation was the correct execution of the 
emergency procedure which automatically starts when a 
failure of the main power sources is detected by the 
automation system of the ship. Aboard the Costa Concordia 
the main source of energy was represented by six diesel 
generator of 14 MVA apparent power each, which stopped 
working just a few tens of seconds after the impact, due to the 
flooding of the machine rooms. At that point, an automatic 
procedure, named Emergency Shutdown, was scheduled to 
run, powered by the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 
located at deck 11 of the ship, well above the sea level. 
Several witnesses reported that some emergency plants of the 
ship did not operate correctly or continuously after the impact. 
For instance, intermittent or lack of operation was allegedly 
experienced from emergency lights, emergency pump, 
passenger elevators and lifeboats winches. The cause or causes 
of these reported failures were not clear; in particular, it was 
not clear whether the EDG was operating or not.  An analysis 
of the Martec SMS log files was then performed for the time 
starting at the impact (h 21.45.12) until the abandon of the 
ship (h 00.20.00). The results are summarized in Figure 7, 
where the events concerning not only the generator itself but 
also the EDG room, such as the ignition and shutoff of the 
fans, are reported. 
As can be seen from a study of Figure 7, the EDG started 
at 21.46.16, stopped to run at 22.15.37, then started again and 
stopped after a few minutes of operation two more times, then 
definitively stopped at 22.36.46, well before the time at which 
the last lifeboats abandoned the ship. This fact could help 
explain the lack of power reported in some testimonies during 
the abandon of the ship: the EDG was not operating correctly. 
Another point worth attention was the correct execution of 
the tests which have to be performed on EDG according to 
SOLAS (Safety Of Life At Sea) regulations and IMO 
(International Maritime Organization) resolutions. Since the 
data about the results of these test that were provided to the 
investigators apparently presented some inconsistencies, we 
decided to compare the information recorded in these files to 
what was stored in the hard disk of Martec SMS. Since Martec 
had provided only the data from 1/12/2012 to 1/14/2012, we 
tried to extract the relevant data from the previous log files by 
means of the technique illustrated in Section II. This allowed 
us to retrieve many pieces of information about the EDG 
starting from 12/25/2012: when the tests were performed, how 
many minutes they lasted, the events concerning the EDG 
room, such as the ignition and shutoff of the fans. As an 
example, in Figure 8 the events associated with the test 
performed on January 8, 2012, are shown. As can be seen, 
according to the data extracted, the EDG was started and then 
stopped twice, the first time after running for about 8 minutes, 
and the second after only 1’31”. Unfortunately, the data do not 
show why the EDG stopped the first time, nor whether the 
duration of the test was enough to allow the engine to attain its 
steady state temperature. 
 
Fig. 7 EDG events after the impact until final blackout. 
 
Fig. 8 EDG periodic test performed on Jan 8, 2012 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have shown a typical case study, related 
to the reconstruction of the events in a disaster involving 
more than 4,000 people, in which most of the information 
was recorded in the memory devices (solid state memories 
and hard disks) of a complex information system. The 
results summarized in the paper demonstrate that this kind 
of information in some cases represents the only valuable 
source of data, not only for forensics purposes, but also for 
further scientific investigations. In the case described in the 
paper, the shipwreck of the Costa Concordia cruise ship, this 
was the only reliable way to attempt an accurate description 
of the dynamics of the accident and of the events 
immediately following the impact with Isola del Giglio’s 
rocks. By using these data it was also possible to ascertain 
whether other responsibilities in addition to those of the 
captain, had to be investigated for a complete reconstruction 
of the casualty.  
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